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it, HERE HAS BEEN considerable concern
about the size of the federal deficit and the
rather modest success of the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Act to reduce it. The traditional, that is,
Keynesian, view of deficit spending in macro-
economics was that it could smooth out fluctua-
tions in economic activity due to gaps between
saving and investment that were primarily the
result of exogenous shifts in investment. From
this perspective, deficit spending was seen as
both desirable and necessary to offset cyclical
fluctuations in economic activity that were char-
acteristic of capitalist, free-market economies.
Recent discussions of government deficits,
however, have focused on their alleged adverse
effects. It is now common to blame deficit
spending for high real rates of interest and the
large and persistent trade deficit. Moreover,
there is widespread concern that large and per-
sistent federal deficits will produce stagnant
economic growth and result in renewed infla-
tionary pressures.
An alternative view, called Ricardian equiva-
lence, however, sees deficit spending as a har-
binger of neither good nor ill. According to this
view, deficit spending cannot offset fluctuations
in economic activity due to exogenous shifts in
either private saving or investment; nor, can it
be blamed for high real interest rates or the
large trade deficit. Moreover, it has no influence
on the outlook for economic growth or infla-
tion. Macroeconomic tests of the effects of
deficits on the economy using U.S. time-series
data have generally favored the Ricardian view.’
The purpose of this article is to review both
views of deficit spending to determine which
view of the relationships between deficit spen-
ding and various associated macroeconomic var-
iables is supported by evidence from 16 OECD
countries over the period 1975.86.2
‘Recently, there have been three excellent surveys of the
empirical investigations of Ricardian equivalence. See
Barro (1987), Bernheim (1987) and Aschauer (1988). Also,
see Evans (1988), Koray and Hill (1988) and Leiderman
and Razin (1988) for more recent work that is not sum-
marized in the three surveys. For some very recent work
on this issue, see Feldstein and Elmendorf (1990),
Modigliani and Sterling (1990) and Kormendi and Meguire
(1990). Most of the empirical evidence against the Ricar-
dian view is at the microeconomic level using cross-
sectional or panel data.
reasons. First, strictly speaking, Ricardian equivalence is a
proposition about what happens when deficit spending is
substituted for taxes at an unchanged expenditure level.
Second, in a rational expectations framework, only unan-
ticipated changes in deficits should affect macroeconomic
variables, and there is no plausible way to isolate the
unanticipated component of deficits from these annual
data. Third, the deficit measures used here are not
cyclically adjusted. Hence, they are endogenous, at least
in part.
2The reader is cautioned that the evidence presented here
can be considered suggestive for only a couple ofI)J:tIH:1(lJflFSt)JF;i%T1)t.
Total saving has two components: public and
private saving. Public saving measures the
government’s surplus or deficit position: sur-
pluses represent positive public saving, while
deficits represent public dissaving. In the Keynes-
ian view, deficits can be used to offset gaps
between saving and investment, thereby stabiliz-
ing output around its potential (full-employment)
level. For example, if private saving is too high
relative to investment to achieve potential out-
put, a government deficit will reduce the amount
of total saving and close the gap between saving
and investment. Conversely, if private saving is
too low relative to investment, a government
surplus can increase total saving. Hence, cyclical
swings in economic activity arising from move-
ments in the saving/investment gap can be
shortened by changing public saving appropri-
ately to maintain total saving at a level consis-
tent with potential output.
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The above analysis is based on the assumption
that public and private saving are separate and
distinct activities.’ In the extreme, they are
viewed as totally independent: changes in public
saving have no direct effect on private saving
and vice versa.4 In this case, total saving will
change one-for-one with changes in public sav-
ing. In the less extreme case, total saving is
simply positively correlated with public saving.’
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In the conventional view, increases in the
deficit cause the interest rate to rise.°Since the
interest rate is the price of credit, it is deter-
mined by the supply and demand for credit. Ac-
cording to the traditional view, an increase in
the deficit increases the demand for credit
relative to the supply and, consequently, in-
creases the interest rate.7
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The effect of deficits on credit demand can
also affect the relationship between government
deficits and the trade deficit. The effect of
deficit changes on interest rates depends on the
slope of the credit supply curve—the steeper
the slope, the larger the effect on interest rates.
Among other things, the slope of the credit
supply curve depends on the degree of open-
ness of the nation’s money and capital markets
to the rest of the world- In general, the more
open these markets are, the flatter is the supply
of credit.
To see this more easily, let’s recast the discus-
sion in terms of the demand for securities. In
this framework, the price of bonds and, hence,
the interest rate are determined by the supply
and demand for bonds. The bond and credit
markets are related inversely: those who supply
credit are demanding bonds while those who
demand credit are supplying bonds. If financial
markets are open and competitive, the demand
curve for bonds seen by individual bond sup-
pliers, including the government, is flat at the
market price of securities. In other words, no
matter how many bonds that individuals, firms
or the government may supply, individually,
they see no effect on the market price of bonds
and, hence, on the interest rate. All market par-
ticipants, including the federal government, are
‘The following discussion is based on the standard lS/LM
aggregate demand-aggregate supply model of the
macroeconomy, where deficit spending is treated as
exogenous.
4Also, deficits can have an indirect effect on saving if the
increase in the deficit spending raises real income and,
hence, saving. Likewise, if a shift in the saving or invest-
ment functions cause a change in income, the deficit will
respond endogenously because both expenditures and
taxes are related to the level of income. Hence, the
assumption that the series are independent applies to their
autonomous components.
5Strictly speaking, the above conclusion holds as long as
public and private savings are not perfect substitutes.
Note, however, fiscal policy is used to offset changes in
private savings, there may be a negative correlation bet-
ween public and private savings even, if at a more
abstract level, the series are unrelated. That is, there may
be a policy reaction function where deficits respond,
presumably with a lag, to changes in private savings.
°Thediscussion here abstracts from the possible effects of
deficits on the rate of inflation, so the hypothesized effect
in this section is on the real interest rate.
‘Most standard IS/LM aggregate demand-aggregate supply
models assume that there is no direct effect of the in-
crease in the deficit on private savings; however, this
assumption is not necessary to obtain the usual implica-
tions. All that is required is that the direct effect on private
savings (if the effect is to increase it) be less than the in-
crease in the deficit. Also, the effect on the interest rate
would be small if the monetary authority monetized debt to
keep real interest rates low. While this is a controversial
issue, the evidence for the U.S. suggests that the Federal
Reserve has not monetized the debt. See Thornton (1984).
This discussion abstracts from the effect of the deficit on
interest rates via a deficit-induced increase in the rate of
inflation.Figure 1
Price Level and Output Determination
“small” relative to the total market, that is, each
is a price-taker.”~Thus, if the economy is suffi-
ciently open, the money and capital markets are
competitive and the government is a price-taker,
changes in deficit spending will have no effect
on the interest rate. Increases or decreases in
the supply of bonds will be fully absorbed at
the current market price.
This does not mean, however, that deficit
spending has no effect on the economy. In the
above case, the deficit will be matched by
foreign claims on U.S. assets. That is, there will
be a capital inflow which, given the balance-of-
payments identity, must be matched by a trade
deficit. Hence, if the economy is “sufficiently”
open, there may be no (zero) correlation be-
tween government deficits and interest rates,
but there may be a positive correlation between
the government and trade deficits.
The strength of this correlation depends on
the degree of openness of financial markets. If
financial markets are only partially open or ap-
proximated by the competitive model, the
government deficit will be positively correlated
with both the interest rate and the trade deficit.
The effect of deficits on economic activity can
be illustrated in terms of the aggregate de-
mandiaggregate supply model. The traditional
view asserts that increases in the deficit will in-
crease the demand for goods and services, as il-
lustrated in figure 1. The extent to which the
increase in aggregate demand affects output or
prices is determined (among other things) by
the slope of the aggregate supply curve. The
Output steeper the slope of the aggregate supply curve,
the larger the effect on the price level and the
smaller the effect on output. If the aggregate
supply curve were vertical, the deficit would af-
fect only the price level.
Economic theory and empirical evidence sug-
gest that the aggregate supply curve is upward-
sloping in the short run.°If this is true, there
should be a positive correlation between deficits
and both prices and output.
In addition to the positive effects of deficits
on output, it is often suggested that deficits can
affect output adversely because of their impact
on interest rates. In a closed economy, some
argue, the deficits raise the real interest rate
and, thereby, “crowd out” private investment.bo
eThis argument also applies to the Federal Reserve’s con-
trol over real interest rates in an open economy, and may
have implications for the Fed’s control over interest rates
in a closed” economy as well.
9The “long run” tends to mean different things in
macroeconomics depending on the context in which it is
used. In the present ISILM aggregate demand-aggregate
supply framework, it means the period of time for all
wages and prices to adjust to exogenous shocks. If all
wages and prices adjust instantaneously, the aggregate
supply curve would be vertical for all time periods. Hence,
the positively sloped aggregate supply curve in this model
results from some imperfections” which keep wages and
prices from adjusting instantaneously to shocks.
‘°Bernheim(1989) and others call this the neoclassical view.
In the neoclassical framework, crowding out necessarily
results from a full-employment assumption. The only way
that the government can spend more is for the private sec-
tor to spend less. That is, interest rates must rise to in-
crease private savings by the amount of the decrease in
public savings. The much-hypothesized adverse effects of
government deficits in the neoclassical view come either
through current government consumption replacing private
investment or the assumed lower marginal productivity of
public capital (see footnoteii). In any event, no explicit
distinction between the conventional and neoclassical
views is made in the text because they are comparable in







PtOther things the same, the degree of crowding For deficits to really be considered infla-
out will be larger, the more responsive interest
rates are to deficit spending and the more
responsive investment spending is to changes in
the interest rate. Thus, the larger the effect of
deficits on interest rates, the smaller should be
the effect on current output. Even with this
crowding out effect, however, deficits and out-
put are still expected to be positively corre-
lated—at least in the short run.”
— >“ <.
To be confused about the effect of deficits on
inflation and the price level is easy; therefore, it
is important to understand and recognize the
distinction between these effects. The fun-
damental distinction can best be seen by noting
that the price level is measured at a specific
point in time, while inflation is measured over
an interval. According to the conventional view,
an increase in the deficit increases aggregate de-
mand and, hence, the price level. Because ad-
justments in the price level take place over
time, such changes are reflected in the mea-
sured rate of inflation during the period of price
adjustment. Other things the same, however,
prices eventually will adjust to their new higher
level after which no further price changes will
be forthcoming. Consequently, while deficit
spending may affect the price level permanent-
ly, it has only a temporary affect on the rate of
inflation.
tionary, they must generate continuing in-
creases in the price level. In terms of the ag-
gregate demand and supply curves, deficits
would have to cause the aggregate demand
curve to keep shifting to the right at a faster
rate than the aggregate supply curve. This
could happen only if deficits become persistent-
ly larger over time, or if they are being mone-
tized (producing increases in the rate of money
growth). The dynamic aspect of inflation, how-
ever, requires a permanent rise in the rate




An alternative view of the effects of deficit
spending is called Ricardian equivalence. Unllke
the Keynesian view, which sees public and
private saving as essentially unrelated, the
Ricardian view sees them as perfect substitutes.”
According to this view, changes in public saving
are matched by an equal but opposite change in
private saving. This fundamental difference
manifests itself in the answer to the question: Is
government debt part of society’s net wealth?
In the Keynesian view, the answer is “Yes,”
while the Ricardian alternative would answer
“No.” According to the Keynesian view, when
‘1Some people fear that deficits could have some longer-
term adverse effects due to crowding out. They argue that,
if deficits lead to higher interest rates and lower invest-
ment, society will be left with a smaller capital stock,
which, in turn, means that future output will be smaller
than it would have been in the absence of deficit-financed
expenditures. Consequently, in the short run, deficits and
output are expected to be positively correlated. In the long
run, however, they may be negatively correlated, or at
least negatively correlated with output growth. There is an
implicit assumption in this argument about the nature of
public expenditures or the relative productivity of “public”
and “private” capital. To see this, note that the supply of
output, Y,, is a function of labor, L,, and the capital stock,
K,, i.e., Y, f(L,, K,).
Output rises with both labor and the stock of capital.
Consequently, if a deficit-induced rise in interest rates
causes investment to fall in this period, the next period’s
capital stock will be smaller, as will the next period’s out-
put. This assumes that all of the rise in the deficit was us-
ed for current consumption. Alternatively, aggregate output
could be expressed as a function of labor and the public
and private capital stocks, K”, and K”,, respectively, i.e.,
V = h(L., K”,, K”,). If the rise in the deficit is used to ac-
quire public capital, the immediate effect on output is in-
determinant even in the case of complete crowding out,
i.e., the decline in private capital from what it would have
otherwise been is equal to the increase in public capital.
See Aschauer (1989a, 1989b).
‘2Deficits can sustain inflation if the monetary authority at-
tempts to peg the nominal interest rate [see Friedman
(1968)J or if deficits become explosive. In the latter case,
the ratio of interest-bearing government debt to output in-
creases without limit forcing the monetary authority to
monetize the debt. See Sargent and Wallace (1981) and
Miller and Sargent (1984) for a discussion of these points
and McCallum (1984) for a qualification.
“This is merely a convenient, equivalent characterization.
Ricardian equivalence stems directly from an intertemporal
resource constraint. That is, for a given path of expen-
ditures, a cut in present taxes necessarily implies an in-
crease in future taxes of equal present value. If an in-
dividual’s demand for goods and services depends on his
‘after tax” net worth—the present value of assets, the
present value of liabilities and the present value of
taxes—a fall in current taxes would necessarily be match-
ed by an increase in the present value of future taxes.
Since a budget deficit merely rearranges the timing of the
tax liability, it cannot affect aggregate demand. The
decrease in public saving (the deficit) must be matched by
an increase in private saving.
Strictly speaking, however, Ricardian equivalence holds
only for a given path of government expenditures. There
can be real effects associated with changing the level or
timing of real government expenditures.29
Figure 2
The Trade Deficit and the Government Deficit
Trade Delicil
the government issues debt, the holder of the
debt views it as an asset; but taxpayers do not
view it as their liability. That is, they do not
believe that they will have to pay current or
future taxes to service or retire the debt. Conse-
quently, their saving behavior is unaffected by
the debt issuance.
The Ricardian view, on the other hand, as-
serts that individuals believe that they, or their
heirs, will have to pay taxes to service and re-
tire the increased debt. Because they perceive
an increase in the present value of their taxes
that just offsets deficit-financed expenditures,
the stock of government debt is not part of so-
ciety’s net wealth. Hence, a rise in the deficit (a
fall in public saving) will be matched by a rise
in private saving in anticipation of future taxes.
If public and private saving are perfect sub-
stitutes, a decline in public saving—the increase
in the deficit—is offset by an increase in private
saving, with no effect on the gap between sav-
ing and investment. According to this view,
then, deficit spending cannot be used to smooth
out cyclical variations in economic activity due
to exogenous swings in the gap between saving
and investment. Moreover, the increased de-
mand for credit due to deficit spending will
be matched by an increase in the supply of
credit due to an increase in private saving. Also,
the increase in aggregate demand that results
from a rise in deficit spending will be offset by
a decrease in aggregate demand due to the fall
in private spending—that is, there is no net
change in aggregate demand.
Because the Ricardian view holds that changes
in deficit have no net effect on the excess de-
mand for credit or aggregate demand, deficits
should be uncorrelated with interest rates, the
trade deficit, the price level, output or total sav-
ing. Deficits and private saving, however, should
be perfectly, positively correlated.
Ehl/II3.IIIICAL EVIIJIENCE
The evidence presented here consists of sim-
ple scatter plots between the government deficit
and the trade deficit, personal saving, real out-
put growth, the price level, the inflation rate
and the nominal interest rate for 16 OECD
countries.’4 (A more detailed statistical analysis
consistent with these scatter plots is presented
in the appendix). The currency-denominated
variables are expressed as a percent of the
country’s gross domestic product, GDP, to put
them in common units, and all variables are ad-
justed for their mean values.’~
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the
so-called twin deficits: the trade and the govern-
ment deficits. The scatter plots show that there
‘4The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Finland, France, Greece, Great Britain, West Germany,
Ireland, Japan, Norway, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland
and the United States. The interest rate was not available
for Austria, Canada, Finland or Greece.
15These are pooled time-series cross-sectional data, where
the average level is allowed to vary each year. See theap-
pendix for details.
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—10is a weak (but statistically significant) positive
association between the two deficits. This
association is consistent with both the conven-
tional view and U.S. time-series data.’6 Barro
(1987), however, finds that the positive associa-
tion exists for U.S. time-series data only when
data for the 1980s are included- This instability
is evident for these cross-sectional data as well.
When the sample includes only observations for
the earlier period, 1975-80, there is no signifi-
cant positive relationship between the twin
deficits. These data are presented in figures 3,
while data for the later period, 1981-86, are
presented in figure 4. Moreover, further analy-
sis suggests that the statistically significant posi-
tive relationship does not hold up if other factors
are considered (see the appendix).
Figure 5 shows the relationship between per-
sonal saving and the government deficit. The
strictest form of the conventional view argues
that these series should be unrelated, while the
Ricardian alternative argues that they should be
perfectly, positively correlated. Neither view is
supported by these cross-sectional data. Instead,
there is a statistically significant negative rela-
tionship between these variables. This anomalous
result may stem from the response of both the
deficit and personal saving relative to GDP to
cyclical movements in output. For example, it is
well-known that deficits typically rise relative to
GDP as output falls and vice versa. If consumers
attempt to maintain their living standard in the
face of a temporary decline in output, personal
saving would fall relative to output. Consequent-
ly, personal saving and government deficits rela-
tive to GDP should be negatively correlated over
the business cycle. In any event, the statistically
significant negative relationship supports neither
hypothesis.’~
Figures 6-9 show the relationship between the
government deficits and inflation, output growth,
the price level and interest rates. In all cases,
there is no statistically significant relationship
between the deficit and these variables.’~Conse-
quently, the cross-sectional data provides little
or no support for the conventional view. On the
other hand, support for the Ricardian alternative
is not overwhelming. While the lack of signifi-
cant relationships between the deficit and in-
terest rates, the trade deficit, output, prices,
inflation and economic growth is consistent with
the Ricardian view, the lack of a statistically
significant positive relationship between the
government deficit and private saving is not. In-
deed, if deficits and private saving are perfectly,
positively correlated because public and private
saving are perfect substitutes, a positive rela-
tionship between these variables should have
been apparent. Thus, at best, the evidence pre-
sented here should be interpreted as cautiously
favoring the Ricardian view.
Whether the evidence presented here is taken
to support, however cautiously, the Ricardian
alternative, the most interesting result is the
lack of evidence to support the conventional
view. In particular, the evidence suggests that
countries with large government deficits do not
have higher interest rates or larger trade defi-
cits despite the widespread opinion to the con-
trary. Of course, these puzzling results could be
an artifact of the simple measures of deficit
spending used here. If the relationships between
government deficits and either interest rates or
the trade deficit were as strong as many com-
mentators suggest, however, it is odd that they
do not emerge inthese annual data across coun-
tries. These results, coupled with the fact that
more sophisticated empirical studies using U.S.
time-series data have also failed to uncover the
conventional relationships, should perhaps lead
advocates of the conventional view either to re-
think their position or present some evidence to
support their claims.
155ee Barro (1987) and Dewald and Ulan (1990). Dewald
and Ulan argue that the observed positive association bet-
ween the twin deficits in U.S. time-series data results from
failing to account for inflation or changes in the market
value of the U.S. federal debt or other major elements of
the U.S. net external wealth position. This argument,
however, requires a different definition of the deficit than
the one used in the conventional stories of the effects of
deficits on economic variables.
17Recently, Swamy, Kolluri and Singamsetti (1990) have sug-
gested that finding any statistically significant relationship
between the deficit and interest rates—although the sign
of the coefficient is opposite that hypothesized by the con-
ventional view—contradicts the Ricardian equivalence
paradigm. Such an extreme view is unwarranted.
18There are two exceptions when first-differences are used.
The one of some importance for the conventional wisdom
is the positive and statistically significant relationship be-
tween the deficit and output growth, suggesting that larger
government deficits have at least some initial positive ef-
fect on real output. Of course, if the rise in the deficit is
due to an increase in government spending, there is a
positive relationship between the deficit and GDP by




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Rate of Inflation and the Government Deficit
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Figure 7
The Growth Rate of Real GDP and the Government Deficit
Figure 8
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The purpose of this appendix is to see if there
is a statistical association between government
deficits and some important macroeconomic
variables as hypothesized by both the conven-
tional view and the Ricardian alternative.
The analysis begins with the following general
equation:
(A1) DV, a,, + j35DEF,, + E~,, i=1,..., K, and
where DV,, and DEF,, denote the t” observation
for the P” country of the dependent variable
and the deficit measure, respectively, a,,, and /3,,
denote fixed parameters and s,, denotes a ran-
dom error.
Equation A.1 cannot be estimated because the
number of parameters exceeds the number of
observations. This problem can be circumvented
by obtaining time-series and/or cross-section
representations of equation Al. The time-series
representation is obtained by imposing the
restrictions a5
= a, and /3,, /3, for all t. The
cross-sectional representation is obtained by im-
posing the restrictions a,, = a0 and /3,, = /3, for
all i. These specifications are:




+ J3,DEF,, + E,~.
A pooled time-series/cross-section representa-
tion can be obtained by imposing the restric-
tions a,, = a and /3,, = /3 for all i and t, to
obtain
(A.4) DV,, = a + /3DEF,, +
(This is equivalent to imposing the restrictions
a, = a and /3, = /3 for all i on the time-series
model or a, = a and /3, = /3 for all t on the
cross-sectional model).
Equations A.2-A,4 were estimated with annual
observations on the government deficits, nomi-
nal interest rate, the trade deficit, the price
level (1980 = 100), the inflation rate, real output
growth and private saving for 16 OECD coun-
tries (K=16) for which the relevant annual data
are available.1 The period is from 1975 to 1986
(T= 12). Because the currency-denominated
variables are expressed in the respective coun-
try’s currency, it is necessary to put these data
in common units. This was done by measuring
these variables as a percent of gross domestic
product, GDP.2
The equations were estimated both in levels
and first-differences. The latter form was
estimated because some of the data showed a
tendency to trend with time. The sample was
too small, however, to perform the usual tests
for stationarity. Estimates of first-order autocor-
relation from equation A,2 suggest that first-
differencing may result in over-differencing in
many cases. Because some of these data ap-
peared to have trends, the pooled time-series!
cross-section equation, A.4, was estimated by
allowing the intercept term to vary with time.3
Because the estimates of equations A.2 and A.3
4The interest rate is the three-month money market rate.
2This was also done by measuring these variables relative
to their mean value for the period and indexing them to
1975. When the variables were normalized in this way, a
measure of the level of GDP was also used as a depen-
dent variable. In nearly all cases, estimates of equations
A.2 and A.3 resulted in insignificant coefficients on the
deficit measure, so the results are not reported here.
Also, the OECD data are based on the system of na-
tional accounts which differs in a number of respects from
our system of national income and product accounts. One
of these is that capital expenditures by government are
not treated as current expenditures, so that the deficit is
current expenditures plus consumption of fixed capital less
~Thereported intercepts in tables A.1 and A.2 are for 1986.
The equations were also estimated using a time trend. The
results with this variable were not qualitatively different
from those that allowed for a time-varying intercept. Con-
sequently, they are not reported here. Also, the equations
were estimated using the alternative dependent variables
as regressors. Except for the interest rate, however, the
qualitative results were unaffected, so these results are
not presented here.
t=1,..., T,
revenue.are qualitatively the same as those of equation
A.4, only estimates of equation A.4 are
presented.
.44444 fl.44-$-/U44-~
Estimates of equation A.4 for both levels and
first-differences are reported in table Al.4 The
only coefficients that are statistically significant
in both the level and first-difference specifica-
tions occur when the trade deficit or private
saving is the dependent variable. In the latter
case, however, the coefficient was negative,
which suggests that increases in deficit spending
are associated with decreases in personal sav-
ing: when public saving decreases, so does
private saving. This result is not consistent with
the Ricardian view that public and private sav-
ing are substitutes; however, it might reflect an
endogenous response of both government
deficits and personal saving to cyclical variations
in output. It is well-known that deficits tend to
rise relative to GDP when output falls. Likewise
it might be that personal saving also rises when
output falls, as individuals try to maintain their
level of consumption in the wake of declining
income levels. In this case, personal saving
would decline relative to GDP. The simultaneous
response of both government deficits and per-
sonal saving to cyclical variation in income
could account for the statistically significant
negative coefficient on the deficit when per-
sonal saving is the dependent variable.
Barro (1987) also found a positive and statisti-
cally significant relationship between the two
deficits using U.S. data, but stated that this re-
lationship emerges only when data for the 1980s
were included. When the sample was partitioned
into 1975-80 and 1981-86 periods, a positive
relationship emerged between the twin deficits
during both periods; however, consistent with
the findings of Barro, the relationship was not
statistically significant during the first period.~
Dewald and Ulan (1990) argue that the posi-
tive relationship between the twin deficits in
the U.S. results from failing to account for infla-
tion or changes in the market value of the net
U.S. federal debt or other major elements of the
U.S. external wealth position. When adjustments
for these factors are made, they find no statisti-
cally significant relationship between the two
deficits. Because this argument might apply to
cross-sectional data as well, caution should be
used in interpreting these results as evidence of
the conventional wisdom on the twin deficits.
This is especially true because the estimated
coefficient on the deficit is not large: a 1
percentage-point rise in the government deficit
relative to GDP would result in only about a .20
percentage point rise in the trade deficit relative
to GDP. Moreover, as shown later, the result is
not robust.
The statistical significance of the coefficient
on the deficit when inflation or the price level
is the dependent variable depends on whether
the equation is estimated in levels or first-
differences, being insignificant in the former
case and significant in the latter. In either case,
however, the coefficient has a sign opposite that
of the conventional story. Consequently, these
results are not evidence for or against either of
these views.
The same result occurs when the growth rate
of GDP is the dependent variable. In this case,
however, the conventional wisdom does not
state the direction of the expected change. From
a short-run perspective, output growth should
be positively related to deficits. From a long-run
perspective, they should be negatively related.
The results in table A.1 suggest a positive rela-
tionship if first differences are used, with a 1
percentage-point increase in the deficit being
associated with a quarter of a percent increase
in the rate of growth of GUP. Of course, if the
increase in the deficit is due to an increase in
government spending, there is a positive rela-
tionship between deficits and GDP by definition,
if crowding out is not complete.
Estimates of the effect of the deficit on in-
terest rates also are sensitive to the specification
of the equation. When levels are used, there is
a negative, but statistically insignificant, relation-
ship between interest rates and the deficit.
When first-differences are used, however, there
is a positive and statistically significant (a one-
~ltwas assumed that variance was constant over time, but
differed over cross-sections, that is, E(r./)= c’, for i=j
and t=s and 0 otherwise. Estimates of equation A.2 in-
dicated considerable cross-sectional heteroskedasticity.
5The estimated coefficient on the deficit variable during the
first period for the level specification was .181, with at-
statistic of 1.42. The comparable statistics for the second
period are .307 and 3.52, respectively. The same statistics
for the two periods for the first-difference specification are
.094 and 1.37 and .226 and 3.01, respectively.Table A.1
Pooled Time-Series, Cross-Sectional Estimates of Equation A.4
Levels First difference
Dependent Deficit Deficit
variab constant - measure .9?~!!,nt - measure
Trade deficit — 1.396’ 0.195’ -0.453 0127’
(2.43) (2.42) (1.43) (2.26)
Personal saving 9.163’ —0.44V 0.197 —0.170’
(14 25) (6.59) (0.77) (3.43)
Output growth 2.34r —0.060 —1.206’ 0.244
~5.67~ ft34~ ~287~ ~3.73~
Inflation 4.444’ —0.061 0.327 —0.154’
(5.76) (0.77) (1.70) (4.40)
Price level 1 517’ —0.002 0.07 —0.004’
(75.44) (1.17) (12.11) (3.58)
Interest rate 8.120 —0.020 —0.886 0.246’
(10.89) (0.28) (1.96) (1.95)
- Indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level.
tailed test at the 5 percent significance level) attributable to two countries, Greece and Nor-
relationship between the two variables. Even if way. Also, the reported results could be due to
one takes the results that are most supportive the failure to account for other factors that af-
of the conventional wisdom, however, the effect fect the relevant dependent variable. Both issues
of deficits on interest rates is fairly weak: a 1 are investigated in table AZ, which reports the
percentage-point rise in the deficit relative to results of estimates of the first-difference speci-
GDP is estimated to produce about a2 5basis- fication when Greece and Norway are deleted
point rise in nominal interest rates. and, alternatively, when all other variables are
included as regressors.6 As the table shows, the
results are sensitive to both of these changes.
- 4~ Deficits are not significantly related to the price
While the results for the first-difference specifi- level or interest rates when the two countries
cation appear to indicate statistically significant are deleted and no longer have a statistically
relationships between the government deficit and significant effect on the trade deficit, the price
all of the dependent variables, these relationships level or the interest rate when the other van-
are not as strong as the results in table A.1 would ables are included. The only significant effects
suggest. Scatter plots of the first-differenced data, that are robust to these changes are those for
mean-adjusted, are presented in figures A.1-A.6. the effect of the deficit on private saving, out-
These data suggest that much of the reported put growth and inflation. In the first and last
statistically significant relationship could be due to case, however, the sign of the coefficient is op-
a relatively few outliers. In most cases, these are posite that suggested by the conventional view.
CAll other variables save the interest rate, since the interest
rate was unavailable for Austria, Canada, Finland and
Greece.Figure Al
Change in The Trade Deficit and the Government Deficit
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Change in Personal Saving and the Government Deficit
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Change in the Inflation Rate and the Government Deficit
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Estimates of Two Alternative First-Difference Specifications
Greece and All alternative dependent
Norway deleted variables included
Dependent Deficit Deticit
variable constant variable constant variable
Trade deficit —0611 e 0 128’~ 0.072 0.013
(2.03) (222) (0 21j (0.23)
Personal savng 0.312 —0.143 0400 —0.213’
(1 28) (2 97) (1 63) (4.55)
Output growth —1 .056~ 0342’ — 0.930’ 0.330
(2.31) (4.01) (226) (4.66)
Inflation 0378 —0126’ 0112 —0093
(1.94) (3 65) (0.54) (2.63)
Price level 0.051 - —0.002 0.062 —0.001
(7.91) (1.73) (6.81) (095)
Interest rate —1.093’ 0 128 — 0.934 0.090
(2.29) (0.78) (1 95) (0.61)
indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level